We consider in this paper a general class of discrete-time partially-observed mean-field games with Polish state, action, and measurement spaces and with risk-sensitive (exponential) cost functions which capture the risk-averse behaviour of each agent. As standard in mean-field game models, here each agent is weakly coupled with the rest of the population through its individual cost and state dynamics via the empirical distribution of the states. We first establish the mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-population limit by first transforming the risk-sensitive problem to one with riskneutral (that is, additive instead of multiplicative) cost function, and then employing the technique of converting the underlying original partially-observed stochastic control problem to a fully observed one on the belief space and the principle of dynamic programming. Then, we show that the mean-field equilibrium policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean-field games have been introduced in [1] and [2] to study fully-observed non-cooperative continuous-time games, when the number of agents is large but finite. The underlying idea of the mean-field method is to transform the decentralized game problem to a centralized stochastic control problem using the so-called 'Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle' [1] . We refer the reader to [3] - [10] for studies of fully-observed continuous-time mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
In this paper, our goal is to show the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for discrete-time partially-observed risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with sufficiently many agents. As it is customary in mean-field game theory, we establish this by first considering the infinite population limit, and then passing back to the finite-agent case.
In the literature, partially-observed risk-sensitive meanfield games have not been studied much, especially in the discrete-time setup. Prior works have mostly considered the risk-neutral continuous-time setup or risk-sensitive fullyobserved continuous-time setup, with [11] , discussed further below, being one exception. We first provide here a brief overview of the literature on the risk-neutral partially-observed setup, and then do the same for the risk-sensitive case. In [12] , the authors study a partially-observed continuous-time mean-field game with linear individual dynamics. In [13] , the authors consider a continuous-time mean-field game with major-minor agents and nonlinear dynamics where the minor agents can partially observe the state of the major agent. In [14] , [15] , the same authors also develop a nonlinear filtering theory for McKean-Vlasov type stochastic differential equations that arise as the infinite population limit of the partially-observed differential game of the mean-field type. In [16] , the authors study a continuous-time partially observed stochastic control problem of the mean-field type and establish a maximum principle to characterize the optimal control. In [17] , the authors consider a continuous-time mean-field game with linear individual dynamics where two types of partial information structure are considered.
In the risk-sensitive case, reference [4] studies a class of fully-observed mean-field games with non-linear individual dynamics and a risk-sensitive cost function. The meanfield equilibrium is characterized via coupled HJB and FP equations and explicit solutions to these equations are given when the individual state dynamics are linear. In [18] , the author considers again a fully-observed continuous-time mean-field game with nonlinear individual dynamics, where state dynamics have L p -norm structure. Stochastic maximum principle is used to characterize the optimal solution of the problem. In [19] , the authors study a partially-observed version of the continuous-time risk-sensitive mean-field game. They establish a stochastic maximum principle for the characterization of the mean-field equilibrium. Reference [20] considers continuous-time fully-observed risk-sensitive mean-field games with linear individual dynamics and local state information for the players. First the existence of meanfield equilibrium is established, and then it is shown that the policies in mean-field equilibrium lead to an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large number of agents. It is also shown that this approximate Nash equilibrium is partially equivalent to the approximate Nash equilibrium of a certain robust mean-field game problem. Finally, [11] presents the counterparts of these results for the discrete-time linear-quadratic risk-sensitive mean-field game.
In an earlier paper [21] , we studied the risk-neutral version of partially-observed mean-field games under a set of assumptions on the system components similar to those made in the next two sections. We also note that in [22] we have studied the fully-observed version of the same problem under a slightly different set of assumptions on the system components.
Due to space limitations, the proofs of most of the results will be sketched or omitted. Full details of the proofs will be provided in the full version of the paper.
II. GAME MODELS

A. Preliminaries
For a metric space E, we let C b (E) denote the set of all bounded continuous real functions on E, and P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on E. For any E-valued random element x, L(x)( · ) ∈ P(E) denotes the distribution of x. The notation v ∼ ν means that the random element v has distribution ν. Unless otherwise specified, the term "measurable" will refer to Borel measurability.
We start with the probabilistic setup of the finite-agent partially-observed mean-field game. Let S, A, and Y be Polish (complete and separable metric) spaces. We consider a discrete-time partially-observed N -agent mean-field game with a state space S, an action space A, and an observation space Y. For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, the state, the action, and the observation of Agent i at time t (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) are respectively denoted by
∈ P(S) denote the empirical distribution of the states (i.e., mean-field term) at time t, where δ s ∈ P(S) is the Dirac measure at s. At the initial time step t = 0, the states are independent and identically distributed according to κ 0 . For each t ≥ 0, the current-observations (g N 1 (t), . . . , g N N (t)) and the next-states (s N 1 (t + 1), . . . , s N N (t + 1)) are distributed according to the probability laws
where q : S × A × P(S) → P(S) is the state transition kernel and l : S → P(Y) is the observation kernel. Define the history spaces Z 0 = Y and Z t = (Y × A) t × Y for t = 1, 2, . . .. A policy for a generic agent is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given Z t . The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted by Π i . LetΠ i be the set of policies in Π i which only use the observations; that is,
We let π (N ) := (π 1 , . . . , π N ) (π i ∈ Π i ) denote the N -tuple of joint policies of all the agents in the game. Under such an N -tuple of policies, the actions of agents at each time t ≥ 0 are obtained with respect to the conditional probability distribution
is the observation-action history observed by Agent i up to time t. The one-stage cost function for a generic agent is a measurable function m : S × A × P(S) → [0, ∞). Then, the agent's finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost under a policy π (N ) ∈ Π (N ) is given by
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor, λ > 0 is the risk factor, and T is the finite horizon of the problem. Since 1 λ log(·) is a strictly increasing function, without loss of generality, it suffices to consider only the part with expectation:
With this cost function, the equilibrium solution for the game is defined as follows: Definition 1: A policy π (N * ) = (π 1 * , . . . , π N * ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game, if
As we have explained in detail in [21] , establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially-observed meanfield games is challenging due to the decentralized and noisy nature of the information structure of the problem. To that end, we slightly change the definition of Nash equilibrium in this model and adopt the approximate Nash equilibrium concept instead of the exact Nash equilibrium.
for each i = 1, . . . , N , and an ε-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
In the risk-sensitive case, the one-stage cost functions are in a multiplicative form as opposed to the risk-neutral case. Therefore, we will first construct an equivalent game model, where the cost can be written in an additive form as in riskneutral case. Then, using the proof technique in [21] , we can establish the existence of the approximate Nash equilibrium by considering first the infinite-population limit N → ∞, and then passing back to the finite-N case.
B. Equivalent Game Model
In this new model, states are the states of the original model plus the one-stage costs incurred up to that time. Namely, the state at time t for Agent i is
In this new model, finite-horizon risk-sensitive cost function can be written in an additive-form like in risk-neutral case. For a generic agent, this new game model is specified by
where L is the maximum risk-neutral discounted-cost that can be incurred. For every t, the state transition kernel p t : X × A × P(X) → P(X) is defined as 1 :
, and µ t,1 is the marginal of µ t on S. Here, p t is indeed the controlled transition probability of the next state s N i (t + 1) and current risk-neutral total discounted cost
Finally, the initial measure µ 0 is given by µ 0 (dx(0)) := κ 0 (ds(0)) ⊗ δ 0 (dm(0)), where the initial states {x N i (0)} are independent and identically distributed according to µ 0 . Note that, in this equivalent game model, the finite-horizon is T +1 instead of T . We also define the empirical distribution of the states at time t as follows:
Recall thatΠ i denotes the set of policies for Agent i that only use observations in the original game. Note thatΠ i is also the set of policies for Agent i that only use observations in the new game model. For Agent i, the finite-horizon riskneutral total cost under the N -tuple of policies π (N ) ∈Π (N ) is denoted as J
) .
The following proposition establishes the equivalence of this new model and the original model. Proposition 1: For any π (N ) ∈Π (N ) and i = 1, . . . , N , we have J (N ) i (π (N ) ) = W (N ) i (π (N ) ). By Proposition 1, in the remainder of this paper we consider the new game model in place of the original one.
C. Infinite Population Limit of the New Game Model
In this sub-section, we introduce the infinite population limit of the new game introduced in the preceding subsection. In the infinite population limit, the mean-field game model for a generic agent is specified by
where, as before, X, A, and Y are the state, action, and observation spaces, respectively. The stochastic kernel p t : X × A × P(X) → P(X) denotes the transition probability, and r : X × P(X) → P(Y) denotes the observation kernel.
The measurable function c t : X × A × P(X) → [0, ∞) is the one-stage cost function and µ 0 is the distribution of the initial state. Define the history spaces G 0 = Y and G t = (Y × A) t × Y for t = 1, 2, . . .. A policy is a sequence π = {π t } of stochastic kernels on A given G t . The set of all policies is denoted by Π.
We let M := µ ∈ P(X) T +2 : µ 0 is fixed be the set of all state-measure flows with a given initial condition µ 0 . Given any measure flow µ ∈ M, the evolution of the states, observations, and actions is as follows
where g(t) ∈ G t is the observation-action history up to time t. A policy π * ∈ Π is said to be optimal for µ if
where the finite-horizon cost of policy π with measure flow µ is given by
Using these definitions, we first define the set-valued mapping Ψ : M → 2 Π as Ψ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ}. Conversely, we define a single-valued mapping Λ : Π → M as follows: given π ∈ Π, the statemeasure flow µ := Λ(π) is constructed recursively as
where P π (da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π and (µ τ ) 0≤τ ≤t . Using Ψ and Λ, we now introduce the equilibrium solution for the mean-field game, which is called mean-field equilibrium.
Definition 3: A pair (π, µ) ∈ Π × M is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈ Ψ(µ) and µ = Λ(π). In other words, the policy π is optimal for the state-measure flow µ, and µ is consistent with the state distributions of the agent when it acts optimally via π.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Existence of Mean-Field Equilibrium
To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, the following assumptions will be imposed on the components of the original game. The following result is the first main result of this paper. It states that there exists a mean-field equilibrium for the new game model. Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 2 holds for the new game model or equivalently Assumption 1 holds for the original game model. The mean-field game introduced in Section II-C X, A, Y, {p t } T +1 t=0 , r, {c t } T +1 t=0 , µ 0 admits a mean-field equilibrium (π , µ). Sketch of Proof: Any measure flow µ ∈ M leads to a non-homogenous partially-observed Markov decision process (POMDP). Note that any POMDP can be reduced to a (completely observable) MDP (see [24] , [25] ), whose states are the beliefs of the observer; that is, the state at time t is z(t) = Pr{x(t) ∈ · |y(0), . . . , y(t), a(0), . . . , a(t − 1)}.
We call this equivalent MDP the belief-state MDP. The belief-state MDP has state space Z = P w (X) and action space A, where P w (X) := µ ∈ P(X) : X w(x)µ(dx) < ∞ . The transition probabilities {η t } T +1 t=0 of the belief-state MDP is given by dx|z, a, y) .
The initial point for the belief-state MDP is µ 0 ; that is, L(z(0)) ∼ δ µ0 . Finally, for each t, the one-stage cost function C t of the belief-state MDP is given by C t (z, a) := X c t (x, a, µ t )z(dx). We define W : Z → R as W (z) = X w(x)z(dx). One can prove that (see [21, Section 4] (v) The initial probability measure δ µ0 satisfies W (δ µ0 ) =: M < ∞.
With these conditions, we can prove Theorem 1 using ideas similar to those in [21, Section 4] . Hence, we omit the details.
B. Existence of Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Let (π , µ) denote the pair in the mean-field equilibrium. In order to prove the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original game model, we need Assumption 3 below in addition to Assumption 1. Let d BL denote the bounded Lipschitz metric on P(S), which metrizes the weak topology [28, Proposition 11.3.2].
Assumption 3: (b) For each t ≥ 0, π t : G t → P(A) is deterministic; that is, π t ( · |g(t)) = δ ft(g(t)) ( · ) for some measurable function f t : G t → A, and weakly continuous.
The following result states that the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for the new game with sufficiently many agents. Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold for the original game model. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists N (ε) such that for N ≥ N (ε), there exists a policy π (N ) which is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the new game model with N agents that was introduced in Section II-B. Since the original N -agent game model is equivalent to the one in Section II-B by Proposition 1, the policy π (N ) is also an ε-Nash equilibrium for the original game with N agents. : Using (π , µ) , we now construct another equivalent mean-field equilibrium in which the policy is deterministic. For t, let Y t+1 := t k=0 Y. Then, for each t ≥ 1, definef t : Y t+1 → A as f t (y(t), . . . , y(0)) := f t y(t), . . . , y(0),f t−1 (y(t − 1), . . . , y(0)), . . . ,f 0 (y(0)) ,
Sketch of Proof
wheref 0 = f 0 . Let π t ( · |y(t), . . . , y(0)) = δf t(y(t),...,y(0)) ( · ). Note that π t is a weakly continuous stochastic kernel on A given Y t+1 . Moreover, π and π are equivalent because, for all t, we have P π a(t) ∈ · |g(t) = P π a(t) ∈ · |y(t), . . . , y(0) = P π a(t) ∈ · |y(t), . . . , y(0) .
Hence, (π, µ) is also a mean-field equilibrium. In the sequel, we use (π, µ) to prove the approximation result. The reason for passing from f t tof t is that the latter policy becomes Markov in an equivalent game model to be introduced below.
This new game model is specified by
where, for each t, B t = X×Y × . . . × Y t + 1-times and A are the Polish state and action spaces at time t, respectively. The stochastic kernel P t : B t × A × P(B t ) → P(B t+1 ) is defined as:
, y(t), y(t − 1), . . . , y(0)), and ∆ t,1 is the marginal of ∆ t on X. Indeed, P t is the controlled transition probability of next state-observation pair, current observation, and past observations, i.e., x(t + 1), y(t + 1), y(t), . . . , y(0) , given the current state-observation pair and past observations, i.e., x(t), y(t), y(t − 1), . . . , y(0) , in the original mean-field game. For each t, the one-stage cost function C t :
, a(t), ∆ t,1 ). Finally, the initial measure λ 0 is given by λ 0 (db) := r(dy|x)µ 0 (dx), where b = (x, y).
Under Assumptions 1 and 3, for each t, the following are satisfied:
(I) The one-stage cost function C t is bounded and continuous. (II) The stochastic kernel P t is weakly continuous.
Recall the set of policiesΠ in the original mean-field game which only use the observations; that is, π ∈Π if π t : Y t+1 → P(A) for each t ≥ 0. Note thatΠ is a subset of the set of Markov policies in the new model. For any measure flow ∆ = (∆ t ) t≥0 , where ∆ t ∈ P(B t ), we denote byĴ ∆ (π) the finite-horizon risk-neutral total cost of the policy π ∈Π in this new model.
We also define the corresponding N agent game as follows. We have the Polish state spaces {B t } T +1 t=0 and action space A. For every t and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }, let b N i (t) ∈ B t and a N i (t) ∈ A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, and let ∆
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t. The initial states b N i (0) are independent and identically distributed according to λ 0 , and, for each t, the next-state configuration (b N 1 (t + 1), . . . , b N N (t + 1)) is generated according to the probability laws
Recall thatΠ i denotes the set of policies that only use local observations for Agent i in the original game. Note that policies inΠ i are Markov for the new model since they partly use the state information. We letΠ c i denote the set of all policies inΠ i for Agent i that are weakly continuous.
For Agent i, the finite-horizon risk-neutral total cost under the initial distribution λ 0 and N -tuple of policies π (N ) ∈ Π (N ) is denoted byĴ (N ) i (π (N ) ). Proposition 2: For any N ≥ 1, π (N ) ∈Π (N ) , and i = 1, . . . , N , we haveĴ i (π (N ) ) = J i (π (N ) ). Similarly, for any π ∈Π and measure flow ∆, we haveĴ ∆ (π) = J µ (π) where µ = (∆ t,1 ) t≥0 .
By Proposition 2, in the remainder of this section we consider the new game model in place of the one introduced in Section II-B.
Define the measure flow ∆ = (∆ t ) t≥0 as follows: ∆ t = L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)), where L(x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) denotes the probability law of (x(t), y(t), . . . , y(0)) in the original mean-field game under the policy π in the mean-field equilibrium. For each N ≥ 1, let b N i (t) 1≤i≤N denote the states of agents at time t in the N -person new game model under the policy π (N ) = {π, π, . . . , π}. Define the empirical distribution ∆
. One can prove that, for all t ≥ 0, we have L(∆ (π (N ) ) =Ĵ ∆ (π) = inf π ∈ΠĴ ∆ (π ). To obtain the approximation result, we should show that if the policy of some agent deviates from the mean-field equilibrium policy, then the corresponding cost of this agent should be close to the cost in the mean-field limit as in Proposition 3, for N sufficiently large. Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are identical for all agents in the game model, it is sufficient to change the policy of Agent 1 for each N . To that end, let {π (N ) } N ≥1 ⊂ Π c 1 be an arbitrary sequence of policies for Agent 1. For each N ≥ 1, let bN i (t) 1≤i≤N be the collection of states in the N -person game under the policyπ (N ) := {π (N ) , π, . . . , π}. Define∆ (N ) t ( · ) := 1 N N i=1 δb(N) i (t) ( · ). One can also prove that, for all t ≥ 0, we have
weakly P(P(B t )), as N → ∞. For each N ≥ 1, let {b N (t)} t≥0 denote the state trajectory of the generic agent in the mean-field game (i.e., infinitepopulation limit) under policyπ (N ) ; that is,b N (t) evolves as follows:
b N (0) ∼ λ 0 andb N (t + 1) ∼ Pπ (N ) t,∆t ( · |b N (t)).
The cost function of this mean-field game is given bŷ
where the actions at each time t ≥ 0 are generated according to the probability law π (N ) t (dâ N (t)|b N (t)) =π (N ) t (dâ N (t)|ŷ N (t), . . . ,ŷ N (0)).
Using (3), we obtain the following result, which we again state without a proof, due to space limitations.
Proposition 4: Let {π (N ) } N ≥1 ⊂Π c 1 be an arbitrary sequence of policies for Agent 1. Then, we have lim N →∞ Ĵ (N ) 1 (π (N ) , π, . . . , π) −Ĵ ∆ (π (N ) ) = 0, whereĴ ∆ (π (N ) ) is given in (4).
Using Propositions 3 and 4, it is now straightforward to complete the proof of Theorem 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has considered discrete-time finite-horizon partially-observed risk-sensitive mean-field games. By letting the number of agents go to infinity, we have first established the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the limiting mean-field game problem. We have then showed that the policy in the mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for similarly structured games with a sufficiently large number of agents.
